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NOTE
DEVELOPING MATERNAL LIABILITY
STANDARDS FOR PRENATAL INJURY
INTRODUCTION
Historically, unborn children received limited legal protection
and any protection afforded them was contingent upon their live
birth.' At early common law, the unborn child was deemed part of
the mother and, as such, any damages for injuries inflicted upon
the fetus prior to birth were recoverable only by the mother.' Ad-
ditionally, the unborn child could not be a murder victim unless
the child was born alive and subsequently died due to the injuries
I See Lenow, The Fetus as Patient: Emerging Rights as a Person?, 9 AM. J. L. & MED.
1, 3 (1983). At common law a fetus, from the time of conception, could be named an heir to
a decedent's estate. The unborn child's property rights, however, only vested upon live
birth. Id. This basic rule continues in effect today. Cf. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-108 (1982).
"Relatives of the decedent conceived before his death but born thereafter inherit as if they
had been born in the lifetime of the decedent." Id.
Nearly all jurisdictions, prior to 1946, denied recovery under tort law for injuries in-
flicted upon a child prior to birth. See W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROS-
SER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 55, at 367 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER &
KEETON]. In 1946, a federal district court held that when direct tortious injury is inflicted
upon a viable fetus later born alive, the child may recover. See Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F.
Supp. 138, 142 (D.D.C. 1946). In the wake of the Bonbrest decision, a "rather spectacular
reversal" occurred, as all jurisdictions now allow an action to recover for prenatal injuries.
See PROSSER & KEETON, supra, § 55, at 368. See also infra notes 7-16 and accompanying
text (discussion of this reversal).
For a short synopsis of the legal rights a fetus has held historically, see generally Myers,
Abuse and Neglect of the Unborn: Can the State Intervene?, 23 DuQ. L. REv. 1, 4-14 (1984).
2 See Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northhampton, 138 Mass. 14, 17 (1884). Dietrich in-
volved a claim by a pregnant woman who suffered a miscarriage when she slipped and fell
upon a crack in a city sidewalk. Id. at 14-15. The five month old fetus died a few minutes
after a premature birth had been induced by the accident. Id. Writing for the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachussetts, Justice Holmes denied recovery on the wrongful death
action and stated that "as the unborn child was a part of the mother at the time of the
injury, any damage to it which was not too remote to be recovered for at all was recoverable
by [the mother] .... " Id. at 17.
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he or she received prenatally.' Today, however, jurisdictions are
expanding the scope of legal protection afforded the unborn.4
Courts recently have begun to recognize a duty on the part of a
pregnant woman to refrain from acts that will cause harm to her
fetus,5 whereas liability for prenatal injury previously had been
I See IV. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, CRIMINAL LAW § 7.1, at 607 (2d ed. 1986). "Being 'born
alive' required that the fetus be totally expelled from the mother and show a clear sign of
independent vitality, such as respiration." Id. The rationale behind the "born alive" re-
quirement was that a live birth, even under the best conditions, was uncertain; therefore,
medical science would be unable to establish a causal connection between the criminal act
and the death of the fetus. See Parness, Crimes Against the Unborn: Protecting and Re-
specting the Potentiality of Human Life, 22 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 97, 130 (1985). See also
Keeler v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 3d 619, 626-32, 470 P.2d 617, 620-24, 87 Cal. Rptr. 481, 484-
88 (1970) (en banc) (reviewing origins of and developments in "born alive" requirement).
4 See, e.g., Hornbuckle v. Plantation Pipe Line Co., 212 Ga. 504, 505, 93 S.E.2d 727, 728
(1956) (child injured before birth may bring cause of action); Amann v. Faidy, 415 ll. 422,
432, 114 N.E.2d 412, 417-18 (1953) (fetus suffered prenatal injuries, was born alive, died of
those injuries-held within state's wrongful death act); Group Health Ass'n v. Blumenthal,
295 Md. 104, 117-18, 453 A.2d 1198, 1207 (1983) (recognizing general principle of right of
action for prenatal injuries).
"The child, if he is born alive, is now permitted in every jurisdiction to maintain an
action for the consequences of prenatal injuries, and if he dies of such injuries after birth an
action will lie for his wrongful death." See PROSSER & KEErON, supra note 1, § 55, at 368
(footnotes omitted). See also Gordon, The Unborn Plaintiff, 63 Micu. L. REV 579, 588-91
(1965) (discussing formation of rights of action for prenatal injuries and various approaches
toward them); Kader, The Law of Tortious Prenatal Death Since Roe v. Wade, 45 Mo. L.
REV. 639, 650-56 (1980) (influence of Roe v. Wade); Note, A Century of Change: Liability
for Prenatal Injuries, 22 WASHBURN L.J. 268, 270-78 (1983) (evolution of right of recovery
for prenatal injury).
In the criminal context, many state legislatures have passed "feticide" statutes elimi-
nating the "born alive" requirement. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 187 (West Supp. 1987)
("Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being, or a fetus, with malice aforethought.");
Ill. P.A. 84-1450, § 2, eff. July 1, 1987, reprinted in ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 9-1.1
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987) (defining crime of "feticide" and prescribing the same penalty as
murder); IOWA CODE ANN. § 707.7 (West 1979) (creating class "C" felony of "feticide" in-
cludes causing death of fetus beyond second trimester or termination of a pregnancy by
anyone not licensed to practice medicine). In the absence of specific legislation extending
protection to the fetus, many courts continue to apply the common law rule that a fetus
cannot be the victim of a murder. See, e.g., State v. Gonzalez, 467 So. 2d 723, 725-26 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (killing of a fetus not homicide unless born alive and then died as result
of injuries sustained). In contrast, other courts though have held that a fetus could be the
victim of a homicide without prior legislative action. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Cass, 392
Mass. 799, 467 N.E.2d 1324, 1330 (1984); State v. Home, 282 S.C. 444, 447, 319 S.E.2d 703,
704 (1984). See generally Note, Taking Roe to the Limits: Treating Viable Feticide as Mur-
der, 17 IND. L. REV. 1119, 1137-41 (1984) [hereinafter Note, Taking Roe to the Limits] (dis-
cussing legislative reforms and proposals).
5 See Stallman v. Youngquist, 129 Ill. App. 3d 859, 862, 473 N.E.2d 400, 404 (1984)
(child has cause of action against mother for prenatal injuries); Grodin v. Grodin, 102 Mich.
App. 396, 401, 301 N.W.2d 869, 871 (1980) (same); see also Beal, "Can I Sue Mommy?" An
Analysis of a Woman's Tort Liability for Prenatal Injury to her Child Born Alive, 21 SAN
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limited to acts committed by persons other than the fetus'
mother.6
This Note will discuss the expansion of the law to include pro-
tection of the fetus from injuries inflicted by the mother. Initially,
it will begin with a brief description of the development of the law
regarding third-party liability for injuries to an unborn child. The
focus will then shift to analyze how the interests of the child to be
born healthy, and of the state to protect the life of the unborn
child, warrant an imposition of a duty on the mother to refrain
from certain conduct harmful to the child she carries. Finally, this
Note will suggest civil and criminal standards of duty that will pro-
tect both the child's and the state's interests without placing an
oppressive burden on the mother.
EXPANSION OF THIRD-PARTY LIABIiTY
Tort Law
Initially, courts denied recovery of damages to an infant for
injuries suffered while in the womb.7 Dietrich v. Northampton8
established this rule in 1884 and reasoned that the unborn child
was not an individual human being, but rather a part of the
mother.9 American courts followed the Dietrich decision until 1946
when Bonbrest v. Kotz' ° allowed recovery for injuries inflicted by a
third-party upon a viable fetus subsequently born alive.'1 The
DIEGo L. REv. 325, 362-67 (1984) (discussing parameters of maternal duty towards protect-
ing fetus); Note, A Maternal Duty to Protect Fetal Health, 58 IND. L.J. 531 passim (1983)
(discussing maternal duty); infra notes 28-70 and accompanying text (same).
' See infra notes 7-21 and accompanying text (discussing tortious and third-party lia-
bility for prenatal injuries).
7 See Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northhampton, 138 Mass. 14, 17 (1884). "This rather
anomalous doctrine was announced by Mr. Justice Holmes in the leading case of Dietrich v.
Inhabitants of Northhampton, which apparently has been relied upon as dispositive and
controlling ever since." Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138, 139 (D.D.C. 1946). For a brief
description of Dietrich, see supra note 2.
8 138 Mass. 14 (1884).
9 Id. at 17.
10 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946).
, Id. at 142. In Bonbrest, a suit was brought on behalf of an infant charging that the
infant was "taken from its mother's womb through professional malpractice." Id. at 139.
Noting that "[tihe law is presumed to keep pace with the sciences and [that] medical sci-
ence certainly has made progress since 1884," the Bonbrest court refused to follow Dietrich
and rejected defendant's motion for summary judgment. Id. at 143.
Viability is the point in the pregnancy at which the fetus is capable of sustaining life
outside the womb. Id. at 140 n.8. In Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), the Supreme Court
apparently concluded that a fetus is viable during the last trimester of pregnancy. See Roe,
[Vol. 61:592
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Bonbrest court held that at viability the fetus was a separate en-,
tity and, therefore, had standing to sue for injuries that the child
would endure throughout his or her life.12
Bonbrest conditioned recovery for prenatal injury on two fac-
tors: first, the child must be born alive; and second, the injuries
must be suffered after viability.13 Since Bonbrest, courts have fur-
ther expanded third-party liability for prenatal injury. An over-
whelming majority of jurisdictions have dropped the "born alive"
rule in tort actions, recognizing that this rule results in the anom-
aly that an individual whose negligence kills a fetus escapes liabil-
ity while an individual who inflicts a less severe injury is held ac-
countable.14 Also, several states have discarded viability as an
410 U.S. at 163-65. As medical science advances, the point at which a fetus is capable of
sustaining life outside the womb becomes increasingly earlier in the pregnancy. See Akron v.
Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 457 (1983) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
12 Bonbrest, 65 F. Supp. at 140.
As to a viable child being "part" of its mother-this argument seems to me to
be a contradiction in terms. True, it is in the womb, but it is capable now of
extrauterine life-and while dependent for its continued development on suste-
nance derived from its peculiar relationship to its mother, it is not a "part" of the
mother in the sense of a constituent element-as that term is generally understood.
Id.
13 See id. at 142. Adopting the rationale of the Supreme Court of Canada in an analo-
gous case, the Bonbrest court stated:
If a child after birth (italics supplied) has no right of action for prenatal injuries,
we have a wrong inflicted for which there is no remedy .... If a right of action be
denied to the child it will be compelled, without any fault on its part, to go
through life carrying the seal of another's fault and bearing a very heavy burden
of infirmity and inconvenience without any compensation therefor. To my mind it
is but natural justice that a child, if born alive and viable (italics supplied) should
be allowed to maintain an action in the courts for injuries wrongfully committed
upon its person while in the womb of its mother.
Id. at 141-42 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Montreal Tramways v. Leveille, 4 D.L.R. 337, 345
(1933)).
4 See, e.g., O'Grady v. Brown, 654 S.W.2d 904, 909 (Mo. 1983) (en banc) (tortfeasors
who cause death should not be treated more favorably than one who causes prenatal injury.
Sustaining the "born alive" rule would perpetuate "the much criticized rule of the common
law which made it 'more profitable for the defendant to kill the plaintiff than to scratch
him.'" Amadio v. Levin, 509 Pa. 199, 205, 501 A.2d 1085, 1087-88 (1985) (citations omitted).
Presently, thirty-five states and the District of Columbia have dropped the "born alive"
rule and allow wrongful death actions to be brought on behalf of stillborn viable fetuses.
See, e.g., Eich v. Town of Gulf Shores, 293 Ala. 95, 98, 300 So. 2d 354, 356 (1974); Summer-
field v. Superior Court, 144 Ariz. 467, 475, 698 P.2d 712, 722 (1985) (en banc); Greater
Southeast Community Hosp. v. Williams, 482 A.2d 394, 397 (D.C. 1984); Volk v. Baldazo,
103 Idaho 570, 574, 651 P.2d 11, 15 (1982); Mone v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 368 Mass. 354,
361, 331 N.E.2d 916, 919-20 (1975); Pehrson v. Kistner, 301 Minn. 299, 300, 222 N.W.2d 334,
336 (1974); Vaillancourt v. Medical Center Hosp., 139 Vt. 138, 143, 425 A.2d 92, 95 (1980).
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artificial distinction and now allow recovery for injuries received
any time after conception. 15
Criminal Law
While most courts in the tort law context have been eager to
expand the protection afforded a fetus, 6 these same courts have
been unwilling to change the common law rules in the criminal
context. This disparity arises from the tradition that tort law is
shaped by the judiciary whereas criminal law is dominated by the
legislature.17 Most courts decline to impose criminal liability for an
injurious act directed towards a fetus if the statute prohibiting
such conduct does not explicitly refer to the "fetus," or the statute
uses the term "person."' 8 Several states, though, have enacted "fe-
ticide" statutes which stipulate that the killing of a viable, unborn
fetus is homicide.' 9 A few courts, however, have not deferred this
But see Hernandez v. Garwood, 390 So. 2d 357, 358-59 (Fla. 1980) (fetus not a person within
wrongful death statute); Kuhnke v. Fisher, 683 P.2d 916, 919 (Mont. 1984) (same); Witty v.
American Gen. Capital Distrib., 727 S.W.2d 503 (Tex. 1987) (same).
16 See, e.g., Simon v. Mullin, 34 Conn. Supp. 139, 147, 380 A.2d 1353, 1357 (Super. Ct.
1977); Renslow v. Mennonite Hosp., 67 Ill. 2d 348, 353, 367 N.E.2d 1250, 1253 (1977);
Torigian v. Watertown News Co., 352 Mass. 446, 448-49, 225 N.E.2d 926, 927 (1977).
16 See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 55, at 368. After the decision in Bonbrest the
"no duty" rule was generally abrogated across the country. Id.
17 See, e.g., State ex rel. Atkinson v. Wilson, 332 S.E.2d 807, 810 (W. Va. 1984).
"[T]here exists a distinction between a court's power to evolve common law principles in
areas in which it has traditionally functioned, i.e., the tort law, and in those areas in which
the legislature has primary or plenary power, i.e., the creation and definition of crimes and
penalties." Id. See also Keeler v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 3d 619, 633, 470 P.2d 617, 625, 87
Cal. Rptr. 481, 489 (1970) (en banc) (similar); People v. Greer, 79 Ill. 2d 103, 116, 402
N.E.2d 203, 209 (1980) (similar); Hollis v. Commonwealth, 652 S.W.2d 61, 63-64 (Ky. 1983)
(similar); People v. Joseph 130 Misc. 2d 377, 380, 496 N.Y.S.2d 328, 330 (Orange County Ct.
1985) ("[llegislature did not intend to make the non-abortional killing of an unborn child a
homicide"); People v. Amarro, 448 A.2d 1257, 1260 (R.I. 1982) (legistlature did not intend to
make fetus a "person" under vehicular homicide statute). See generally Parness, supra note
3, at 123-25 (discussing liability and criminal statutes); Note, Taking Roe to the Limit,
supra note 4, at 1132-37 (discussing criminal liability and legistlative intent).
18 See, e.g., People v. Guthrie, 97 Mich. App. 226, 232, 293 N.W.2d 775, 780 (1980). The
Michigan Court of Appeals acknowledged that the "born alive" rule is archaic and outmo-
ded, but refused to change the common law "born alive" requirement without express legis-
lative action. Id. at 232, 293 N.W.2d at 780-81. See also Meadows v. State, 291 Ark. 105,
-, 722 S.W.2d 584, 586-87 (1987) (fetus not person within meaning of manslaughter stat-
ute); State v. Brown, 378 So. 2d 916, 918 (La. 1979) (killing of fetus was not homicide de-
spite expanded definition of person); People v. Vercelletto, 135 Misc. 2d 40, 45, 514
N.Y.S.2d 177, 180 (Ulster County Ct. 1987) (duty of legislature to define crimes unknown at
common law).
16 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §187 (West Supp. 1987) ("Murder is the unlawful killing
of a human being, or a fetus, with malice aforethought."); Ill. P.A. 84-1450, § 2, eff. July 1,
[Vol. 61:592
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decision to the legislature and have judicially abolished the "live
birth" requirement for homicides.20 Relying on prior determina-
tions that a viable fetus is a person within the wrongful death stat-
utes, both the Massachussets and South Carolina Supreme Courts
have held that a viable fetus is a "person" within the meaning of
the applicable homicide statute.21
Two important public policies are served by expanding protec-
tions for the fetus. First, the right of a child to be born free from
injury is recognized to the fullest extent possible under the law.22
Second, the expansion reflects an exercise of the state's compelling
interest in protecting potential life.23 Significantly, the focus of the
1987, reprinted in ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 9-1.1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987) (defining
crime of "feticide" and imposing criminal liability for killing of fetus).
Although the California statute does not distinguish between a "viable" and "pre-via-
ble" fetus, the statute has been interpreted to include only "viable" fetuses. See People v.
Smith, 59 Cal. App. 3d 751, 759, 129 Cal. Rptr. 498, 504 (1976).
20 See Commonwealth v. Cass, 392 Mass. 799, 807, 467 N.E.2d 1324, 1329 (1984); State
v. Home, 282 S.C. 444, 447, 319 S.E.2d 703, 704 (1984). In Home, the defendant stabbed his
pregnant wife and killed the full-term fetus she was carrying. Horne, 282 S.C. at 446, 319
S.E.2d at 703-04. In Cass, the defendant was charged with vehicular homicide, having hit a
woman who was eight and one-half months pregnant, causing the fetus to die in the womb.
Cass, 392 Mass. at 802, 467 N.E.2d at 1325. Both Cass and Home held that a viable, unborn
child could be the victim of a homicide, but reversed lower court convictions because a
change in the interpretations of the statutes at issue could only be applied prospectively,
not retroactively. Cass, 392 Mass. at 808, 467 N.E.2d at 1330; Home, 282 S.C. at 447, 319
S.E.2d at 704.
21 See Home, 282 S.C. at 447, 319 S.E.2d at 704. "It would be grossly inconsistent for
us to construe a viable fetus as a 'person' for the purposes of imposing civil liability while
refusing to give it a similar classification in the criminal context." Id.
In Cass, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts looked to Mone v. Greyhound
Lines, 368 Mass. 354, 331 N.E.2d 916 (1975), where it was held that a viable fetus would be
considered a "person" under the wrongful death statute. See Cass, 392 Mass. at 804, 467
N.E.2d at 1325. The Cass court stated: "Despite the fact that Mone was a civil case, we can
reasonably infer that, in enacting the [vehicular homicide statute] the Legislature contem-
plated that the term 'person' would be construed to include viable fetuses." Id. at 805, 467
N.E.2d at 1326.
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts rejected the assertion that the legislature
intended to "crystallize" the pre-existing common law definition of "person," reasoning that
it is the function of the courts to develop and redefine the meaning of the common law "in
harmony with the general tendency of our law." Id. at 805, 467 N.E.2d at 1327 (quoting
Mone, 368 Mass. at 365, 331 N.E.2d at 922 (Braucher, J., dissenting)).
22 See, e.g., Greater Southeast Community Hosp. v. Williams, 482 A.2d 394, 397 (D.C.
1984) ("[i]nherent in our adoption of Bonbrest is the recognition that a viable fetus is an
independent person with the right to be free of prenatal injury"); Renslow v. Mennonite
Hosp., 67 Ill. 2d 348, 353, 367 N.E.2d 1250, 1255 (1977) (right to be born free from prenatal
injuries); Amadio v. Levin, 509 Pa. 199, 204, 501 A.2d 1085, 1087 (1985) (a child en ventre sa
mere is an individual with a right to be free of prenatal injury).
23 See Summerfield v. Superior Court, 144 Ariz. 467, 698 P.2d 712 (1985) (en banc).
1987]
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law is no longer merely to compensate the mother for the loss of
her pregnancy; rather, the law is recognizing the rights of the fe-
tuses themselves to protection. 4
Protection of a fetus from the acts of the mother serves to pro-
mote the same interests as does protection of the fetus from acts of
a third party. In the fetal-maternal relationship, however, certain
rights of the mother may be limited in order to achieve fetal pro-
tection.25 As medical science becomes increasingly aware of the se-
vere effects that maternal diet, activity and surroundings may have
upon a developing fetus,26 the question arises as to what degree a
pregnant woman should be under a duty to refrain from engaging
in activities that are harmful to the unborn child.27
"Aside from the remedial objective of compensating survivors, we also discern, in other ar-
eas of the law, a legislative goal of protecting the fetus." Id. at 476, 698 P.2d at 721. See also
Eich v. Town of Gulf Shores, 293 Ala. 95, 300 So. 2d 354 (1974). "A potential future human
life is present from the moment of conception and the state's interest and general obligation
to protect life thus extends to prenatal life." Id. at 99, 300 So. 2d at 357.
24 See, e.g., Amadio, 509 Pa. at 206-07, 501 A.2d at 1087-89. "This Court's former view
that the real objective of these lawsuits was to compensate the parents of their deceased
children twice for the parents' emotional distress is not only incorrect, but if accepted,
merely perpetuates the notion that a child is inseparable from its mother while en ventre sa
mere." Id. at 206, 501 A.2d at 1088. See Note, The Creation of Fetal Rights: Conflicts with
Women's Constitutional Rights to Liberty, Privacy, and Equal Protection, 95 YALE L.J. 599
(1986). "The law no longer recognizes the fetus only in those cases where it is necessary to
protect the interest of the subsequently born child and her or his parents. Rather, the law
has conferred rights upon the fetus qua fetus." Id. at 603-04.
See generally Eich v. Town of Gulf Shores, 293 Ala. 95, 99, 300 So. 2d 354, 357 (1974)
(state's interest and general obligation to protect prenatal life); Danos v. St. Pierre, 402 So.
2d 633, 638 (La. 1981) ("a human being exists from the moment of fertilization and implan-
tation"); Vaillancourt v. Medical Center Hosp., 139 Vt. 138, 142, 425 A.2d 92, 94 (1980)
(viable unborn child considered a living human being); Greater Southeast Community Hosp.
v. Williams, 482 A.2d 394, 397 (D.C. 1984) (viable fetus independent person with right to be
born free of prenatal injury).
2 See Myers, supra note 1, at 55-59. A mother's rights of privacy; bodily integrity and
personal security; and liberty and freedom from personal restraint may conflict with a
child's right to be born healthy. Id. See, e.g., Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding Hosp. County
Auth., 247 Ga. 86, 274 S.E.2d 457 (1981) (per curiam) (full-term fetus' right to be born
outweighs mother's rights to bodily integrity); Robertson, Procreative Liberty and the Con-
trol of Conception, Pregnancy and Childbirth, 69 VA. L. REv. 405, 437 (1983) (mother's
freedom may be restricted to protect fetus); Special Project, Legal Rights and Issues Sur-
rounding Conception, Pregnancy, and Birth, 39 VAND. L. REv. 597, 819 (1986) (outlining
maternal and fetal rights).
2" See generally Shaw, Conditional Prospective Rights of the Fetus, 5 J. LEG. MED. 63,
66-78 (1984) (brief summary of correlation between maternal and fetal health).
27 Compare id. at 116 (fetal rights outweigh maternal rights) with Note, supra note 24,




At first blush, the doctrine of parental tort immunity would
appear to bar a suit by, or on behalf of, a child for injuries received
in the womb due to the mother's negligence.28 While this may be
true in states that still adhere to this doctrine,29 a majority of
states have either abandoned the doctrine completely or have
greatly limited the scope of the immunity.30
Parental tort immunity is designed to maintain family har-
mony, prevent fraudulent or collusive claims, and to preserve pa-
rental authority. 1 The majority of courts now find these rational-
28 See generally PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 122, at 904-07 (discussing parental
immunity). Parental tort immunity is simply a judicial refusal to allow a child to sue his
parents for personal torts, whether negligent or intentional. See id. The doctrine was first
recognized in Hewellette v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891) (suit by daughter against
mother for wrongful confinement in an insane asylum disallowed). Hewellete was followed
by McKelvey v. McKelvey, 111 Tenn. 388, 77 S.W. 664 (1903) (suit for cruel and inhuman
treatment dismissed because father has right to control his child); and Roller v. Roller, 37
Wash. 242, 79 P. 788 (1905) (suit by daughter against father for forcible rape dismissed to
maintain family tranquility). These three cases formed the "great trilogy" of parent-child
tort immunity. See Note, The Child's Right to Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness:
Suits by Children Against Parents for Abuse, Neglect and Abandonment, 34 RUTGERS L.
REV. 154, 162-70 (1981) (brief history of parental immunity doctrine and its abrogation). For
an overview of the doctrine of parental immunity, see Beal, supra note 5, at 333-57.
2 See, e.g., Thomas v. Inman, 268 Ark. 221, 223, 594 S.W.2d 853, 854 (1980) (to allow
child to sue parents is "repugnant to natural sentiments concerning family relations");
Vaughan v. Vaughan, 161 Ind. App. 497, 500, 316 N.E.2d 455, 457 (1974) (parents immune
from liability for torts committed against unemancipated minor); McNeal v. Estate of Mc-
Neal, 254 So. 2d 521, 523 (Miss. 1971) (widow and daughter have no standing to bring tort
claim against estate of deceased father). One commentator has calculated that twelve states
remain loyal to the doctrine, while six other states allow a suit only if the parent's act was
willful or wanton. See Beal, supra note 5, at 336-37 nn.67-68.
-1 See, e.g., Goller v. White, 20 Wis. 2d 402, 122 N.W.2d 193 (1963). Goller was the first
decision to abolish the general rule of non-liability of a parent, but it retained immunity for
acts involving an exercise of parental authority or parental discretion in providing care. Id.
at 412-13, 122 N.W.2d at 198. See also Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914, 921, 479 P.2d 648,
653, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288, 293 (1971) (reasonable parent standard adopted); Gelbman v.
Gelbman, 23 N.Y.2d 434, 437, 245 N.E.2d 192, 193, 297 N.Y.S.2d 529, 530-31 (1969) (paren-
tal-tort immunity abolished).
One recent case has calculated that eleven states have completely abandoned the paren-
tal immunity doctrine or have failed to adopt it. See Rousey v. Rousey, 528 A.2d 416, 419
n.3 (D.C. 1987). Another eleven states have abandoned it in automobile negligence cases.
See id. at 419 n.4. Five more states have abandoned the doctrine in automobile negligence
cases where insurance is available to the parent. See id. at 419 n.5. Seven states have aban-
doned it but have retained an exception for exercise of reasonable parental discretion in the
exercise of parental authority or in the provision of necessities. Id. at 420 n.6.
21 See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 122, at 904-07.
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izations insufficient to deny recovery to a child injured through his
or her parents' negiigence.2 Many courts have found that the
availability of insurance, while not a justification for a cause of ac-
tion in itself, has rendered parental immunity an obstacle to the
maintenance of family harmony."3 Courts reason that family har-
mony is best achieved by allowing the injured child to recover,
thereby relieving the financial burden that the child's injury places
on the family.3 4 The potential for a collusive claim has been con-
sidered a weak justification by many courts because it has always
been the province of the judge and jury to sift the meritorious
claim from the fraudulent. 5 The reasoning behind the rejection of
the foregoing rationales for parental immunity applies with equal
force in the context of prenatal injury.36 Further, the third basis
underlying parental immunity, concern for parental authority, is
obviously not applicable with regard to prenatal injury.
Therefore, the abrogation of parental tort immunity combined
with the recognition of a child's right to recover for prenatal injury
creates the very real possibility that a mother could be held civilly
liable for her negligent conduct during pregnancy.38 In two juris-
dictions this has become a reality.3
'2 See supra note 30.
'3 See Sorenson v. Sorenson, 369 Mass. 350, 362, 339 N.E.2d 907, 914 (1975). "When
insurance is involved, the action between the parent and child is not truly adversary .... Far
from being a potential source of disharmony, the action is more likely to preserve the family
unit in pursuit of a common goal - the easing of family financial difficulties stemming from
the child's injuries." Id. at 362-63, 339 N.E.2d at 914 (footnotes omitted).
" See, e.g., Williams v. Williams, 369 A.2d 669, 672 (Del. 1976) (when liability insur-
ance involved, domestic tranquility argument is "hollow"); Ard v. Ard, 414 So. 2d 1066,
1067-68 (Fla. 1982) (parental immunity waived to extent of liability insurance); Nocktonick
v. Nocktonick, 227 Kan. 758, 767, 611 P.2d 135, 141-42 (1980) (same); Gelbman v. Gelbman,
23 N.Y.2d 434, 438, 245 N.E.2d 192, 193-94, 297 N.Y.S.2d 529, 531-32 (1969) (compulsory
automobile insurance removes argument that parental immunity preserves family harmony).
11 See Rousey v. Rousey, 528 A.2d 416, 420 (D.C. 1987); Stallman v. Youngquist, 152 Ill.
App. 3d 683, - , 504 N.E.2d 920, 926 (1987); Nocktonick, 227 Kan. at 769, 611 P.2d at
142; Sorenson, 369 Mass. at 365, 339 N.E.2d at 914-15.
" See Stallman v. Youngquist, 152 Ill. App. 3d 683, - , 504 N.E.2d 920, 920 (1987)
(rejecting parent-child tort immunity as a bar to suit by child against mother for prenatal
injury); Grodin v. Grodin, 102 Mich. App. 396, 401, 301 N.W.2d 869, 871 (1980).
11 See Stalman, 152 Ill. App. 3d at -, 504 N.E.2d at 926 (suit by infant for prenatal
injuries does not present issue of whether exercise of parental authority is immune).
" See Beal, supra note 5, at 350. The author calculated that thirty states would theo-
retically be amenable to suits by children against their mothers for prenatal injury. Id.
"' See Stallman, 152 Ill. App. 3d at -, 504 N.E.2d at 927; Grodin, 102 Mich. App. at
401-02, 301 N.W.2d at 871.
1987] MATERNAL LIABILITY
Third-Party Analysis
The Michigan Court of Appeals, in Grodin v. Grodin,40 was
the first court to recognize a duty on the part of a mother to her
fetus.41 In Grodin, the plaintiff-child sued his mother alleging that
she was negligent in taking a prescription drug during pregnancy
which resulted in the discoloration of the child's teeth.42 Relying
upon Womack v. Buckhorn,43 which recognized a child's right
when born to recover for prenatal injuries, 44 and Plumley v.
Klein,45 which limited parental immunity to acts of reasonable pa-
rental discretion in the provision of food, clothes and medicine,46
the Grodin court concluded that a mother would be required to
refrain from unreasonable conduct that would result in injury to
the fetus.47 Thus, she would be subject to the same liabilty to her
fetus for negligent conduct as would a third person.48
Similarly, in Stallman v. Youngquist,49 the Appellate Court of
Illinois held that the public policy consideration of possible disrup-
tion of family harmony does not outweigh a child's right to be
compensated for prenatal injuries received due to her mother's
'0 102 Mich. App. 396, 301 N.W.2d 869 (1980).
4 Id. at 400-01, 301 N.W.2d at 870-71.
42 Id. at 398, 301 N.W.2d at 869-70. Grodin involved a claim by the child and his father
to recover damages for discoloration of the child's teeth due to the mother's ingestion of
tetracycline during pregnancy. Id. The suit was brought against the mother's physician for
negligently failing to determine that the mother was pregnant and the mother for failing to
seek proper prenatal care and neglecting to inform the doctor that she was taking tetracy-
cline. Id.
384 Mich. 718, 187 N.W.2d 218 (1971).
See id. at 725, 187 N.W.2d at 222. Womack held that "justice requires that the prin-
ciple be recognized that a child has a legal right to begin life with a sound mind and body."
Id. (quoting Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 364, 157 A.2d 497, 503 (1960)).
" 388 Mich. 1, 199 N.W.2d 169 (1972).
46 Id. at 8, 199 N.W.2d at 172-73.
47 See Grodin, 102 Mich. App. at 398, 301 N.W.2d at 871. The Grodin court remanded
the case for a determination of whether it was reasonable for the mother to take the tetracy-
cline and ordered the trial court to balance the utility of the drug for the mother's health
against the risk created for the plaintiff as a fetus. Id.
" Id. at 400, 301 N.W.2d at 870. Womack, the Grodin court stated, "refers only to
wrongful conduct of another for which compensable damages are available. As a result, the
litigating child's mother would bear the same liability for injurious, negligent conduct as
would a third person." Id.
40 129 Ill. App. 3d 859, 473 N.E.2d 400 (1984) [hereinafter Stailman I]. In Stallman I,
the plaintiff's father brought a negligence action on her behalf against her mother and an-
other motorist (Youngquist) for injuries received in an automobile accident. See id. at 859,
473 N.E.2d at 400.
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:592
negligence while driving a car.5 0 As in Grodin, the Staliman court
also relied on prior cases that limited parental immunity and cases
that recognized the right of a child when born alive to recover for
prenatal injury.51 Further, the Stallman court apparently adopted
the Grodin rationale by also holding a mother to the same stan-
dard of conduct as a third party.2
In Carpenter v. Bishop,53 the Arkansas Supreme Court was
confronted with the issue of whether a mother could be liable for
the wrongful death of her fetus.54 In Carpenter, a mother negli-
gently drove her automobile into a bridge abutment, killing herself
and her viable fetus.5 5 The father brought a wrongful death action
60 See id. at 865, 473 N.E.2d at 404. "Other jurisdictions which have abolished the par-
ent-child tort immunity doctrine have met the family disruption argument by reasoning
that the injury itself and not the consequent suit is the factor which may upset the family
unit." Id.
1 See id. at 862-64, 473 N.E.2d at 401-03. The Stallman I court relied on Renslow v.
Mennonite Hospital, 67 Ill. 2d 348, 367 N.E.2d 1250 (1977), which held that viability was no
longer required for an action for prenatal injury. Id. The plaintiff in Stallman was a five-
month-old fetus at the time of the injury and, under Renslow, "was a legal person for pur-
poses of maintaining, after her birth, a lawsuit." Stallman 1, 129 Ill. App. 3d at 862, 473
N.E.2d at 402.
The Stallman I court also relied on Schenk v. Schenk, 100 Ill. App. 2d 199, 241 N.E.2d
12 (1968), which held that the parent-child tort immunity doctrine does not bar suit for acts
"wholly unrelated to the objectives or purposes of the family itself." Id. at 201, 241 N.E.2d
at 14. The Stallman I court concluded that the plaintiff should be allowed to prove that her
mother's negligence while driving a car "to a restaurant was not an act arising out of the
family relationship and directly connected with family purposes and objectives" and re-
manded for a new trial. Stallman I, 129 Ill. App. 3d at 865, 473 N.E.2d at 404. On remand,
the trial court dismissed the case on a motion for summary judgment. See Stallman v.
Youngquist, 152 Ill. App. 3d 683, -, 504 N.E.2d 920, 921 (1987) [hereinafter Stallman
II]. On appeal, the Stallman II court once again held that a mother could be liable for
injuries to her fetus caused by the mother's negligence. Id. at -, 504 N.E.2d at 927. In
Stallman II, however, the court reevaluated its prior determination that Illinois recognized
the parent-child tort immunity doctrine with an exception for acts that were not connected
with family purposes and objectives. Id. at -, 504 N.E.2d at 924-26. Upon this reevalua-
tion, the Stalman II court concluded that the Illinois Supreme Court had never expressly
recognized the parental tort immunity doctrine, but rather the doctrine was merely a crea-
ture of the appellate court. Id. at __, 504 N.E. 2d at 923. The Stallman II court then
concluded that it was within its authority to completely abrogate the doctrine. Id. at -'
504 N.E.2d at 925.
" See Stailman II, 152 Ill. App. 3d at -, 504 N.E.2d at 927. The Stallman II court
cited Grodin with approval and stated: "[wie note that the Michigan Court of Appeals,
applying Michigan's qualified abrogation of parental tort immunity, has held that a child's
mother bears the same liability for negligent conduct, resulting in prenatal injuries, as would
a third person." Id.
53 290 Ark. 424, 720 S.W.2d 299 (1986).
" See id.
55 Id. at 425, 720 S.W.2d at 299-300.
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against the mother's estate.56 Since Arkansas still recognizes paren-
tal tort immunity for unintentional torts,5" the Carpenter court
held that a mother could not be liable to a fetus for the mother's
unintentional torts.58 Arkansas law, however, does provide an ex-
ception to parental immunity and imposes liability for willful con-
duct by a parent that causes injury to a child.59 Although the Car-
penter court mentioned this exception, it did not discuss whether
such conduct by a mother would give rise to liability for prenatal
injury.60
Following the analysis applied in both Grodin and Stallman,
that is, a prior recognition of the right of a child to recover for
prenatal injury and an abrogation or limitation of the scope of par-
ent-child immunity, several states would appear to be amenable to
suits by children against their mothers for prenatal injury. 1 For
example, New York has recognized the right of a child born alive
to recover for injuries inflicted by third parties after viability,6 2
and has completely abrogated the parental immunity doctrine.63
Therefore, applying the Grodin analysis, New York courts theoret-
ically should allow a suit by a child against the mother for injuries
negligently inflicted after viability.6 4
Reasonable Pregnant Woman Standard
It is submitted that the Grodin and Stallman decisions, while
reaching a correct conclusion, failed to analyze fully this emerging
1, Id. at 426, 720 S.W.2d at 300. The father filed suit as next friend on behalf of the
fetus and also instituted a derivative action on behalf of himself and the siblings of the
fetus. Id. The Carpenter court declined to reach the issue of whether a fetus could be a
"person" within the meaning of the wrongful death statute. Id.
', See, e.g., Thomas v. Inmon, 268 Ark. 221, 223, 594 S.W.2d 853, 854 (1980) (reaffirmed
doctrine of parental immunity for unintentional torts).
See Carpenter, 290 Ark. at 426, 720 S.W.2d at 300.
" See Atwood v. Atwood, 276 Ark. 230, 238, 633 S.W.2d 366, 371 (1982) (parents' will-
ful speeding while child in car gives rise to liability).
c' See Carpenter, 290 Ark. at 426, 720 S.W.2d at 300. Although the court discussed
Atwood, it did not express an opinion as to whether a mother could be liable for an inten-
tional or willful tort that injures her fetus. See id.
6 See supra notes 38-52 and accompanying text.
02 See Woods v. Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349, 357, 102 N.E.2d 691, 695 (1951).
'3 See Gelbman v. Gelbman, 23 N.Y.2d 434, 437, 245 N.E.2d 192, 193, 297 N.Y.S.2d
529, 530-31 (1969).
64 Under the same rationale, New York courts would dismiss wrongful death actions
brought on behalf of a fetus against a mother because New York does not recognize such an
action against third parties. See Endresz v. Friedberg, 24 N.Y.2d 478, 485-86, 248 N.E.2d
901, 905, 301 N.Y.S.2d 65, 70-71 (1961) (denying wrongful death action for fetus).
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area of tort law. Holding a mother to the same standard of conduct
as a third person, while representing a mechanically correct con-
vergence of current law regarding parental immunity and recovery
for prenatal injury, fails to account for the uniqueness of the fetal-
maternal relationship. This becomes evident when one considers at
what point the mother's duty should arise.
According to the Grodin and Staliman courts, the mother's
duty arises at the time of conception."' Conception is an appropri-
ate point for a third party's duty towards a fetus to arise;66 a third
party at least foresees the risk that his conduct poses toward a
pregnant woman. Therefore, the injury to the fetus by a third
party may be said to have been proximately caused by the breach
of duty owed to the mother. However, a mother, at the time of
conception, will very often be unaware that she is pregnant. Since
one cannot commit a tort upon oneself, a woman who reasonably
does not know that she is pregnant cannot perceive the risk at
which her conduct places the fetus. Therefore, a woman's duty to
refrain from acts harmful to the fetus should not arise until she
knows or reasonably should know she is pregnant.6 Stated in other
terms, the third party's conduct will always be unreasonable vis &
vis the mother, yet the mother's conduct towards herself will be
unreasonable only when she knows of the pregnancy.
It is suggested that adoption of a "reasonable pregnant wo-
man" standard, rather than a third-party standard, will cure this
oversight in the Grodin analysis. The duty on the part of a woman
under a reasonable pregnant woman standard will arise when she
knows or reasonably should know that she is pregnant. Liability
will be imposed for conduct by a pregnant woman that is generally
known to result in injury to a fetus 8 if the utility of the mother's
" See Grodin v. Grodin, 102 Mich. App. 396, 396-400, 301 N.W.2d 869, 870 (1980).
Although the Grodin court did not explicitly state that the mother's duty arises at concep-
tion, it relied on Womack which recognized the right of a fetus to recover for injuries from
the time of conception. See Womack v. Buckhorn, 384 Mich. 718, 725, 187 N.W.2d 218, 222
(1971). In Stailman, the plaintiff-child received her injuries before viability, when the
mother was five months pregnant. See Stallman v. Youngquist, 129 Ill. App. 3d 859, 860, 473
N.E.2d 400, 402 (1984).
66 See supra note 15 for a listing of jurisdictions that recognize a duty from time of
conception.
67 See Beal, supra note 5, at 365 (discussing difficulty of diagnosing early stages of
pregnancy).
"8 See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 32, at 173-75. Dean Prosser states that
"[t]he standard of conduct must be an external and objective one." Id. at 173-74. Yet, Dean
Prosser also notes a subjective element in the determination of negligence. Id. at 175.
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conduct is outweighed by the harm to the fetus6 9 It is submitted
that a reasonable pregnant woman standard best balances the
rights of the fetus without unduly burdening the mother."°
MATERNAL LIABILITY-CRIMINAL CONTEXT
Presently, no state has held a mother criminally liable for
causing injury to her fetus. Yet, increasingly, courts have invoked
state regulatory powers to protect fetuses from the actions of their
mothers.71
Prenatal Abuse and Neglect
Until recently, most child abuse statutes were not interpreted
to include the unborn.72 In People v. Reyes,73 a mother who gave
birth to a child addicted to heroin was convicted of child abuse,
but the California appellate court reversed her conviction on the
ground that the statute's use of the word "child" did not include
the unborn. 4 Other courts, however, have determined that a
mother's conduct toward her fetus could constitute abuse within
The conduct of the reasonable person will vary with the situation with which
he is confronted. The jury must therefore be instructed to take the circumstances
into account; negligence is a failure to do what the reasonable person would do
"under the same or similiar circumstances." Under the latitude of this phrase, the
courts have made allowances not only for external facts, but sometimes for certain
characteristics of the actor himself, and have applied, in some respects, a more or
less subjective standard.
Id. (footnote omitted).
10 See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947) (Judge Learned
Hand's attempt to formulate unreasonable behavior/utility-risk analysis). See also PROSSER
& KEETON, supra note 1, § 31, at 173. "[T]he basis of the law of negligence is usually deter-
mined upon a risk-benefit form of analysis." Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
291 comment d (1965) (determination of unreasonableness based on risk-benefit analysis).
70 See Beal, supra note 5, at 368. Professor Beal, although recognizing that maternal
liability for prenatal torts is consistent with established tort principles, asserts that the
"theoretically simple standard of 'knew or should have known'" could result in "disparate
determinations of when in fact the legal duty of care attached to the woman." Id. It is
submitted, however, that a reasonable pregnant woman standard is the only standard that
can reconcile both the rights of the mother and the child.
71 See infra notes 73-93 and accompanying text.
72 See Reyes v. Superior Court, 75 Cal. App. 3d 214, 141 Cal. Rptr. 912, (1977) (heroin
abuse during pregnancy not within proscription of child endangering statute); In re Dittrick
Infant, 80 Mich. App. 219, 263 N.W.2d 37 (1977) (legislature did not intend term "child" to
include unborn).
73 75 Cal. App. 3d 214, 141 Cal. Rptr. 912 (1977).
"' See id, at 216, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 913.
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the applicable child abuse statutes. 5 In In re Baby X 78 and In re
Ruiz," the Michigan and the Ohio courts, respectively, deprived
mothers of custody of newborns addicted to heroin, declaring these
newborns to be abused children.718 Neither the Michigan nor the
Ohio child abuse statute mentions the unborn, yet the courts of
both states rejected the mother's contention that a mother's con-
duct toward a fetus was not the type of conduct prohibited by the
statute.719 The courts based their decisions on the recognition of the
state's interest in protecting potential life8" and the right of the
child "to begin life with a sound mind and body."'"
Additionally, at least one New York court has ruled that a de-
termination of child abuse may be based solely on the mother's
conduct during pregnancy.2 In In re Smith, 3 the court held that a
71 See, e.g., In re Baby X, 97 Mich. App. 111, 116, 293 N.W.2d 736, 739 (1980) (heroin-
addicted newborn is "neglected" within the meaning of statute); In re Smith, 128 Misc. 2d
976, 979, 492 N.Y.S.2d 331, 334 (Family Ct. Monroe County 1985) (where mother's prenatal
abuse of alcohol was sufficient to establish an imminent danger of impairment of physical
condition to the unborn child, the child is determined to be a neglected child); In re Ruiz,
27 Ohio Misc. 2d 31, 35, 500 N.E.2d 935, 939 (C.P. Wood County, Juv. Div. 1986) (similar).
'0 97 Mich. App. 111, 293 N.W.2d 736 (1980).
17 27 Ohio Misc. 2d 31, 500 N.E.2d 935 (C.P. Wood County, Juv. Div. 1986).
" See id. at 35, 500 N.E.2d at 939. The Ohio court in Ruiz concluded that:
[c]learly the natural mother in using heroin so close to the birth of this child did
create a substantial risk to the health of said child as defined in [the child abuse
statute]. Accordingly, the court reache[d] the inescapable conclusion that the alle-
gations of the complaint alleging that the child was abused have been established.
Id. Similarly, the Michigan court in Baby X held "that a newborn suffering narcotics with-
drawal symptoms as a consequence of prenatal maternal drug addiction may properly be
considered a neglected child within the jurisdiction of the probate court." In re Baby X, 97
Mich. App. at 116, 293 N.W.2d. at 739.
" See id. at 114-15, 293 N.W.2d at 739; In re Ruiz, 27 Ohio Misc. 2d at 34-35, 500
N.E.2d at 938.
80 See In re Ruiz, 27 Ohio Misc. 2d at 34, 500 N.E.2d at 938. "The essence of Roe, the
state's interest in the potential human life at the time of viability, in conjunction with
Ohio's developing case law, compels a holding that a viable unborn fetus is to be considered
a child under the provisions of [Ohio's child abuse statute]." Id.
"I See id. at 35, 500 N.E.2d at 939 (quoting Womack v. Buckhorn, 384 Mich. 718, 725,
187 N.W.2d 218, 222 (1971), originally stated in Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 364, 157
A.2d 497, 503 (1960)). The Ruiz court held "a child does have a right to begin life with a
sound mind and body, and ... that a viable fetus is a child under the existing child abuse
statute. ... Ruiz, 27 Ohio Misc. 2d at 35, 500 N.E.2d at 939. See also In re Baby X, 97
Mich. App. at 115, 293 N.W.2d at 739. "Since a child has a legal right to begin life with a
sound mind and body we believe it is within his best interest to examine all prenatal con-
duct bearing on that right." Id. (citation omitted).
81 See In re Smith, 128 Misc. 2d 976, 492 N.Y.S.2d 331 (Family Ct. Monroe County
1985). A prior New York decision had suggested that a mother's drug use during pregnancy
may support a determination of neglect since such activity indicates an inability to provide
adequate care after the child is born. See In re Male R, 102 Misc. 2d 1, 422 N.Y.S.2d 819
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mother's abuse of alcohol during pregnancy, and her failure to ob-
tain proper prenatal medical care placed the child in "'imminent
danger' of impairment of physical condition."' Noting the state's
interest in protecting potential life,aS the Smith court concluded
that a fetus came within the meaning of "child" under the child
abuse and neglect laws, 86 and that those laws represented a "rea-
sonable mechanism to implement the state's interest in the
unborn. '87
Prenatal Intervention
Some jurisdictions have approved intervention during a preg-
nancy in order to prevent harm to the fetus. These actions have
included: ordering a pregnant heroin addict to enroll in a detoxifi-
(Family Ct, Kings County 1979).
In Male R, an infant was born suffering from narcotics withdrawal. See id. at 2, 422
N.Y.S.2d at 820. The Male R court concluded that the mother's continued use of drugs after
birth demonstrated that the child was under a "substantial risk of impairment." Id. at 8,
422 N.Y.S.2d at 822-24. However, the court concluded that it was "far from clear that such
impairment, caused as it was by prenatal maternal conduct, would be sufficient, standing
alone, to support a finding of neglect." Id. at 9, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 824.
At least one New York court prior to Male R stated that "[a] new-born baby having
withdrawal symptoms is prima facie a neglected baby under [the child abuse and neglect
laws] .... ." In re Vanesa "F", 76 Misc. 2d 617, 619, 351 N.Y.S.2d 337, 340 (Sur. Ct. N.Y.
County 1974). The Male R court, however, stated that it was unclear whether the Vanesa F
court determined that a newborn suffering withdrawal was actually "impaired" within the
meaning of the statute, or that the withdrawal symptoms provided evidence that the new-
born was in imminent danger of impairment. See Male R, 102 Misc. 2d at 9, 422 N.Y.S.2d at
824.
83 128 Misc. 2d 976, 492 N.Y.S.2d 331 (Family Ct. Monroe County 1985).
" See id. at 979, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 334. In Smith, the mother had a severe alcohol prob-
lem and, despite the urgings of social workers during the course of her pregnancy, failed to
undergo treatment for alcohol abuse. Id. at 977, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 332. Consequently, the
baby was born prematurely and showed signs of fetal alcohol syndrome. See id. at 976, 492
N.Y.S.2d at 332-33.
"I See id. at 980, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 335.
80 Id. at 980, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 334. The court stated that the Supreme Court's decision
that a fetus is not a person within the context of the fourteenth amendment, Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973), "should not preclude 'the states of the power to grant legal recog-
nition to the unborn in non-14th Amendment situations.'" Smith, 128 Misc. 2d at 980, 492
N.Y.S.2d at 334 (quoting Myers, supra note 1, at 15). While "the Supreme Court has recog-
nized that the State has 'important and legitimate interest in protecting the potentiality of
human life,'" id. (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 162), the Smith court posited that this
interest should be extended to protect the quality of life. See Smith, 128 Misc. 2d at 980,
492 N.Y.S.2d at 335.
87 Id. "The laws relating to abuse and neglect... certainly afford an 'effective means to
achieve prevention,' and represent a 'reasonable mechanism to implement state interests in
the unborn.'" Id. (quoting Myers, supra note 1, at 29-30).
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cation program and to submit to weekly urinalysis until she gave
birth,"8 and requiring a mentally ill pregnant woman restrained to
prevent her from harming the developing fetus.8 9 A few courts
have even sanctioned caesarean section delivery of infants over the
objections of the mother, if the procedure was considered neces-
sary to save the child's life.90
In the cases discussed to this point, courts have either acted
proscriptively to prevent a mother from harming her unborn
child,91 or have deprived mothers of custody of their children on
the basis of abuse inflicted prenatally.2 Recently, California be-
came the first state to criminally prosecute a woman for prenatal
child abuse.
11 See Shaw, supra note 26, at 103-04 (discussing unreported case in which court or-
dered a female heroin addict to enroll in a detoxification program and submit to weekly
urinalysis until she gave birth).
89 See Robertson, supra note 25, at 446 n.127 (discussing case of a mentally ill pregnant
woman who was civilly committed because her conduct threatened her viable fetus).
" See In re A.C., 533 A.2d 611 (1987) (caeserean section delivery of 26-week-old fetus
ordered against wishes of terminally ill pregnant woman); Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding
County Hosp. Auth., 247 Ga. 86, 90, 274 S.E.2d 457, 459-60 (1981) (per curiam) (caesarean
section delivery of full-term fetus ordered over the mother's religious objections when at-
tending physicians deemed operation necessary to save fetus' life); Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Mor-
gan Memorial Hosp. v. Anderson, 42 N.J. 421, 423, 201 A.2d 537, 538 (per curiam) (blood
transfusion of mother ordered over religious objections because it was necessary to protect
health of viable fetus), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964).
Since 1981, in at least twenty-one cases, court orders have been sought by hospital au-
thorities to compel caeserean sections, prenatal surgery and detention of mothers when the
life or health of the fetus was deemed in danger. See N.Y. Times, Nov. 23, 1987, at Al, col. 1
(discussing survey conducted by New England Journal of Medicine). In eighteen of these
cases, the orders were granted. Id.
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachussets has implied that, in certain situations,
compelling a mother to undergo surgery to protect fetal health would be justified. See Taft
v. Taft, 388 Mass. 331, 334, 446 N.E.2d 395, 397 (1983). Also, in an unreported Colorado
case, a court ordered a cesarean section delivery to protect the fetus. See Myers, supra note
1, at 28.
In Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hospital Authority, 247 Ga. 86, 274 S.E.2d 457
(1981), the concurring opinion noted the mother's religious objection to surgery and
acknowledeged her right to practice her religion and her right to bodily integrity. However,
Presiding Justice Hill noted that the court concluded that the state's interest in protecting
potential life outweighed the mother's rights and ordered the surgery. Id. at 89, 274 S.E.2d
at 460 (Hill, P.J., concurring). "The power of a court to order a competent adult to submit
to surgery is exceedingly limited. Indeed, until this unique case arose, I would have thought
such power to be nonexistent." Id. (Hill, P.J., concurring). "The free exercise of religion is,
of course, one of our most precious freedoms." Id. at 91, 274 S.E.2d at 461 (Smith, J., con-
curring) (quoting In re Sampson, 65 Misc. 2d 658, 665, 317 N.Y.S.2d 641, 649 (Family Ct.
Ulster County 1970)).
91 See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
92 See supra notes 79-87 and accompanying text.
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The defendant-mother, Pamela Rae Stewart Monson, suffered
from placenta previa, a condition in which the placenta can be-
come detached from the uterine wall, and was warned by her doc-
tor that if she began to bleed, she should seek immediate medical
attention . 3 She was also warned not to ingest "street drugs. ' 94 Ms.
Monson gave birth to a full-term, severely brain damaged baby
who died a few weeks later. 5 High levels of amphetamines and
barbituates were found in the baby's blood and it was discovered
that Ms. Monson did not seek medical help until several hours af-
ter she began hemorrhaging 6 Ms. Monson was charged with crim-
inal neglect under California's criminal child support statute.9 7
The statute's scope, which explicitly extends to the unborn, im-
poses criminal sanctions on a parent for failure to provide his or
her child with necessary food, clothing and medical treatment.9 8
The trial court dismissed the suit, stating that the purpose of
the statute was to ensure payment of child support, "not to punish
women for conduct during pregnancy. '"" However, the trial judge
did assert that "[i]t would appear ... that since (Roe v. Wade)
gives the state a compelling interest in the health of the fetus dur-
ing the last trimester, the state's legislature could pass a statute
protecting the life of the unborn child under narrowly defined
conditions."' 00
It is submitted that imposition of criminal liability on a
mother for acts harmful to the fetus is consistent with the expan-
sion of protection for the fetus. Criminal liability may serve as a
deterrent, 1 1 and foster both the right of the fetus to be born
healthy, and the state's interest in protecting potential life.10 2 It is
asserted that where the state has the authority to intervene in a




o1 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 270 (West Supp. 1987).
us Id.
DI See Judge Dismisses Criminal Charges for Fetal Abuse, L.A. Daily J., Feb. 27, 1987,
at 1, col. 4.
100 See Woman is Acquitted in Test of Obligation to an Unborn Child, L.A.Times, Feb.
27, 1987, at 1, col. 1.
101 See W. LAFAVE & A. ScoT, supra note 3, § 1.5, at 24. "[T]he sufferings of the crimi-
nal for the crime he has committed are supposed to deter others from committing future
crimes, lest they suffer the same unfortunate fate." Id.
"02 See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text (discussing fetus' rights and state's
interest).
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pregnancy to prevent harm to the fetus, it logically follows that the
state has the authority to deter that harmful conduct through the
imposition of criminal sanctions.
Constitutional Considerations and Proposed Guidelines
Restricting a woman's behavior to protect the fetus raises con-
stitutional concerns. The Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade10 3 held
that a woman's right to privacy extends to decisions regarding
whether or not to continue her pregnancy. 104 The Court, though,
recognized that this right is not absolute and may be overcome by
a sufficiently compelling state interest.10 5 The state has an interest
to protect the "potentiality of life" which, at viability, becomes
sufficiently compelling to prohibit a woman from terminating the
pregnancy through abortion. 06 It is possible for the state's interest
to be sufficiently compelling to prevent a woman from terminating
her pregnancy through indirect means as well.10 7 It is further con-
ceivable to extend the state's interest to the protection of the qual-
103 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
104 Id. at 153. The Court stated that the right of privacy encompasses "a woman's deci-
sion whether or not to terminate her pregnancy." Id.
1o Id. at 154.
[A] state may properly assert important interests in safeguarding health, in main-
taining medical standards, and in protecting potential life. At some point in preg-
nancy, these respective interests become sufficiently compelling to sustain regula-
tion of the factors that govern the abortion decision. The privacy right involved,
therefore, cannot be said to be absolute. In fact, it is not clear to us that the claim
asserted by some amici that one has an unlimited right to do with one's body as
one pleases bears a close relationship to the right of privacy previously articulated
in the Court's decisions. The Court has refused to recognize an unlimited right of
this kind in the past.
Id.
1oe Id. at 163. "With respect to the State's important and legitimate interest in poten-
tial life, the 'compelling' point is at viability. This is so because the fetus then presumably
has the capability of meaningful life outside the mother's womb." Id. The Court defined a
viable fetus as one "potentially able to live outside the mother's womb, albeit with artficial
aid." The Court said further that "viability is usually placed at about seven months (28
weeks) but may occur earlier, even at 24 weeks." Id. at 160.
State regulation protective of fetal life after viability thus has both logical and
biological justifications. If the State is interested in protecting fetal life after via-
bility, it may go so far as to proscribe abortion during that period, except when it
is necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother.
Id. at 163-64.
107 See Robertson, supra note 25, at 437. Once the woman decides to "forgo abortion
and the state chooses to protect the fetus, the woman loses the liberty . . . to adversely
affect the fetus." Id. (footnote omitted).
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ity of life, 108 thereby subjecting a woman to liability for reckless or
intentional harm to her unborn child.
Furthermore, Roe v. Wade held that a fetus is not a person
only within the context of the fourteenth amendment;10 9 the Su-
preme Court did not rule out the possibility of granting protection
to the fetus in a non-fourteenth amendment context. °10 If imposi-
tion of liability would not "unduly interfere" with a woman's abor-
tion decision, liability would then be within the confines set by
Roe.'"
It is suggested that the following factors be considered when
attempting to balance the competing interests involved in impos-
ing criminal sanctions. First, culpability for prenatal injury by a
mother would most likely need to be limited to injuries inflicted
after viability, since a woman has the right to abort a pre-viable
fetus." 2 Imposition of criminal liability for acts committed prior to
viability would place the state in the position of indirectly encour-
aging women to abort to escape prosecution.
Second, the right of the mother to engage in the activity would
have to be weighed against the state interest, and the right of the
'01 See Parness, supra note 3, at 114. "[I]t follows, that when a woman has decided to
carry her pregnancy to full term, the state has a legimate interest in promoting the quality
of life of the unborn child." Id. See also In re Smith, 128 Misc. 2d 976, 980, 492 N.Y.S.2d
331, 335 (Family Ct. Monroe County 1985) (state interest extends to protecting quality of
life).
... Roe, 410 U.S. at 158. "[Tjhe word 'person,' as used in the Fourteenth Amendment,
does not include the unborn." Id.
11 See Parness & Pritchard, To Be or Not to Be: Protecting the Unborn's Potentiality
of Life, 51 U. CIN. L. Rav. 257, 258 (1982).
By holding that a fetus is not a person under the fourteenth amendment, the
Supreme Court did not prohibit lawmakers from extending to the unborn the ben-
efits of personhood in other cases. In fact, the Court noted that the state has an
"important and legitimate interest in protecting the potentiality of human life."
The failure to understand the Roe decision has led not only to courts mistakenly
denying the unborn non-fourteenth amendment protections to which the unborn
are entitled, but also to the public failing to comprehend the discretion remaining
to American lawmakers in characterizing personhood.
Id. See also Myers, supra note 1, at 60. "Despite its lack of constitutional rights, the unborn
child is protected by substantive non-fourteenth amendment law. The most important
sources of protection are tort and child abuse and neglect laws." Id.
"' See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977). "Roe did not declare an unqualified 'consti-
tutional right to an abortion,' .... Rather, the right protects the woman from unduly bur-
densome interference with her freedom to decide whether to terminate her pregnancy." Id.
at 473-74. See also Robertson, supra note 25, at 447 n.129. "[Ihf the mother has already
made up her mind to carry the child to term, then the fact that the intervention occurs
prior to viability arguably should not matter." Id. at 446-47.
112 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 154.
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child to be born healthy."' Where the infringement on the
mother's rights would be minimal, and prohibition of an act would
protect the health of the fetus, its prohibition would be justified."4
However, if proscribing an act or imposing a duty to act would in-
trude significantly on the mother's privacy or bodily integrity,
criminal liability should arise only if permanent or severe injury
would result to the fetus." 5
Under this balancing approach, a mother who ingests harmful
drugs or excessive amounts of alcohol could be criminally liable" 6
since there is no fundamental right to use these substances" 7 and
the resulting harm to the fetus would be severe." 8 However, it is
much less certain whether a mother's smoking or occasional drink-
ing would give rise to criminal liability. While it would be possible
to ban all maternal use of tobacco and alcohol,"' it is suggested
'" Cf. Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hosp. Auth., 247 Ga. 86, 274 S.E.2d 457
(1981) (per curiam). In Jefferson, the Georgia Supreme Court ordered a caesarean section
delivery of a fetus over the mother's religious objections when the attending physicians
deemed the operation necessary to sustain the life of the unborn child. Id. at 90, 274 S.E.2d
at 460. The court weighed the mother's right to bodily integrity against the state's interest
in protecting potential life and the fetus' right to be born alive. Id.
11 See Note, Constitutional Limitations on State Intervention in Prenatal Care, 67
VA. L. REV. 1051, 1067 (1981). After discussing when state intervention in a pregnancy
should be permissible, the author concluded:
Certainly where infringement of individual rights is slight and governmental ac-
tion is necessary to protect a fetus's health, intervention is proper. Yet where state
action would intrude significantly into a woman's privacy, the importance of pri-
vacy to both the woman and her fetus strongly supports requiring the state to
demonstrate that the intervention is truly necessary-that it prevents serious in-
jury to the fetus and that no less intrusive means would afford adequate
protection.
Id. See also Myers, supra note 1, at 69-72 (discussing when state intervention in pregnancy
is justified).
' See supra note 113.
11 See Shaw, supra note 26, at 88-89. "The fetal brain develops rapidly in the last two
months of pregnancy, and a pregnant woman's alcohol and drug abuse is especially harmful
to the fetus at this time. It is conceivable that an alcoholic or an addict could be institution-
alized for the specific purpose of protecting her fetus." Id. (footnotes omitted). See also
Nelson, Buggy & Weil, Forced Medical Treatment of Pregnant Women: "Compelling Each
to Live as Seems Good to the Rest," 37 HASTINGs L.J. 703, 711-12 (1986) (discussing medical
risks to fetus of maternal behavior).
' See State v. Murphy, 117 Ariz. 57, 60, 570 P.2d 1070, 1073 (1977); Robertson, supra
note 25, at 442-43 (no fundamental right to use Psychoactive substances). But see Myers,
supra note 1, at 76 (arguing that effects of binge drinking by mother are too speculative to
warrant proscription through state intervention).
18 See Shaw, supra note 26, at 73-75.
11 See Robertson, supra note 25, at 442.
There is no question that a state could prohibit actions by a pregnant woman
that might reasonably be thought to kill a viable fetus in utero cause it to be born
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that such a prohibition would unduly infringe upon a mother's
right to privacy. The effects of smoking and occasional drinking
may have a deleterious effect on the unborn but they do not immi-
nently threaten the fetus. 2 '
Holding a mother criminally liable for harming her fetus
would primarily serve as a deterrent. 121 To serve as a deterrent, it
is first necessary that the mother realize the danger in which she is
placing the fetus, and therefore a subjective standard of knowledge
should be applied.122 It is suggested that the following elements be
proven before criminal liability is imposed: that the woman actu-
ally knew she was pregnant when she committed the act;123 that
she knew her conduct posed a severe risk to the health of the un-
born child; that she proceeded in reckless disregard of this knowl-
edge; and that it was within her ability to avoid the conduct. 24 It
in a damaged state. Laws that prohibited pregnant women from obtaining or using
alcohol, tobacco, or drugs likely to damage the fetus would be constitutional, even
if these laws applied only to pregnant women. . . .A statute forbidding pregnant
women the use of alcohol or tobacco in order to minimize risks to their fetuses
would pass the courts' "rational basis" test.
Id. at 442-43.
120 See Note, supra note 5, at 534. Maternal smoking increases the risk of prematurity
and abortion and under certain situations may be life threatening. It is possible that further
medical research may establish that these activities are more damaging than presently
known, and prohibition may then be appropriate. See id. See generally Nelson, Buggy &
Weil, supra note 116, at 711-14 (discussing adverse consequences to fetuses resulting from
maternal use of drugs, alcohol, and cigarettes).
12I See supra note 107 and accompanying text. Imposing liability on pregnant women
for abuse of their fetuses could also serve an educational purpose. "[C]riminal punishment
serves, by the publicity which attends the trial, conviction and punishment of criminals, to
educate the public as to the proper distinctions between good conduct and bad-distinc-
tions which, when known, most of society will observe." W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTT, supra note
3, § 1.5, at 25.
122 See id. § 3.5. According to the Model Penal Code, one acts "knowingly" as to the
results of his conduct if "he is aware that it is practically certain that his conduct will cause
such a result." MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(b)(ii) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). As to the
attendant circumstances, one acts "knowingly" when "he is aware . . .that such circum-
stances exist." Id. § 2.02(2)(b)(i). Some states utilize an "objective" interpretation of
"knowledge" and apply a "reasonable man standard." W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTT, supra note 3,
§ 3.5, at 220.
11 This may seem unnecessary if viability is the cut-off point, but for several reasons a
woman may not be cognizant of her pregnancy prior to viability. See, e.g., Grodin v. Grodin,
102 Mich. App. 396, 398, 301 N.W.2d 869, 869 (1980) (mother not cognizant of her preg-
nancy until the eighth month). It is submitted that while a mother's negligent failure to
realize her pregnancy could give rise to civil liability, it should not give rise to criminal
liability. See supra note 122 (discussing knowledge as an element of a crime).
2I This last factor is designed to avoid discrimination against a woman who may not
have the financial means to care for her baby. Prenatal care is, unfortunately, not as accessi-
ble in the same degree to the poor as it is to the more affluent. Also, a woman who must
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is submitted that if these elements were established, criminal lia-
bility would be imposed only for wanton or reckless disregard for
the life or health of the fetus.
CONCLUSION
A child's right to be born healthy and the state's interest in
protecting potential life justifies the imposition of a duty on a
pregnant woman to refrain from certain conduct that is injurious
to the child she carries. Such a duty need not unduly burden a
woman's right to privacy and personal liberty if the proper stan-
dard is applied. In the civil context, where maternal liability would
serve to alleviate the suffering of the injured child through mone-
tary compensation, it is suggested that a reasonable pregnant wo-
man standard will properly balance these competing interests. In
the criminal context, where sanctions are imposed to punish and
deter, it is suggested that a more stringent standard of wanton or
reckless disregard of the life and health of the fetus is necessary to
preserve the mother's freedom, while still protecting the life and
health of the unborn child. These standards are offered as a start-
ing point for determining the scope of maternal liability as the law
regarding the unborn continues to expand.
Gerard M. Bambrick
work in order to support herself and her family may have no alternative but to expose the
fetus to certain occupational dangers. See Shaw, supra note 26, at 70-71 (discussing risks of
maternal exposure to occupational hazards on fetuses).
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